The underrepresentation of low-income countries in nuclear disarmament forums

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This discussion paper is part of a project to map and analyse low-income country participation across a range of multilateral disarmament forums. Comparative analysis will be also conducted between forums covering different subjects (e.g. small arms, cluster munitions) and on specific dimensions (e.g. gender) to examine how patterns of representation vary. This project complements current work by the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) to examine data on a selection of disarmament processes and improve inclusiveness based on this analysis.1 It also draws substantially on data and analysis compiled by Reaching Critical Will. The observations and analysis in this paper are provisional, they are for discussion and to provide a basis for further qualitative investigation of the factors behind the trends reported.

Lower-income countries are less likely to send representatives to meetings of multilateral forums on nuclear disarmament, they will tend to field smaller delegations, and will make fewer individual statements on average than richer countries with an equal right to participate.

These are clear trends in available attendance and participation data on meetings of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW).

Low-income country underrepresentation in these forums is significant. Nuclear disarmament is a global concern: the interests of all countries must be represented for any attempt to achieve the most equitable outcomes for populations worldwide. Low-income countries in particular could be more vulnerable to the negative impacts that any nuclear explosion would have on economies, the environment, and development objectives.2 Also, a very high proportion of low-income countries are part of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.3 By contrast, a high proportion of high-income countries are part of a nuclear alliance (Figure 1). This suggests competing interests and perspectives on nuclear disarmament between higher and lower income countries, which may not currently be adequately represented in multilateral forums.

Country representation is analysed by region as well as income in this paper. In identifying the barriers to a globally equitable consideration of nuclear disarmament issues, other factors relating to interests in and the impact of nuclear weapons also need consideration (but are beyond the scope of this paper). For example, countries that have experienced nuclear testing (excluding current nuclear weapons possessors) currently speak proportionally less across all the meetings studied for this paper than those who have carried out nuclear tests.

Importantly, governments may not always represent the interests of all individuals living in their territories, including those most affected by the
presence and potential use of technologies of violence such as nuclear weapons. The inclusion of civil society and other voices in multilateral disarmament forums is important to addressing this, and is examined briefly below.

It is clear from the data that lower-income country underrepresentation is not equally pronounced across all nuclear disarmament forums. In particular, the recent HINW conferences have been somewhat more inclusive. Where better representation is achieved, in terms of both quantity and quality of participation, discussions may have a greater chance of generating a more balanced debate and a larger range of proposals to address global disarmament concerns.

Nuclear disarmament forums

The forums examined in this paper were selected as the principal locations of current multilateral discussion on nuclear disarmament. Their processes are described briefly below to contextualise the data. The NPT and HINW are focused on in this paper as the forums around which there is the most activity, and for which there was the most comprehensive data. The data used covers all meetings between 2010-14, where available.

The NPT is the only multilateral treaty that carries an obligation on all states parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. It entered into force in 1970. Every five years a Review Conference is held in New York to assess implementation of the treaty, resulting in a consensus document of conclusions and recommendations for action. Review Conferences are preceded by Preparatory Committees which meet during a three year period and produce non-binding documents for use by the Review Conference.

The CTBT, negotiated in 1996, has not yet entered into force due to the non-accession of certain states listed in annex II of the treaty. Every odd-numbered year, the UN Secretary-General convenes an Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT, which are open to all countries and held in Vienna or New York. Every even-numbered year, Ministerial Conferences are held on the margins of the UN General Assembly. These are open to any country particularly committed to achieving the entry into force of the CTBT.

The CD is a permanent, multilateral body for the negotiation of disarmament treaties, with 65 members. It meets for discussions 24 weeks a year in Geneva and has a permanent agenda that includes all aspects of nuclear weapons. The presidency of the CD rotates alphabetically between all members. The CD has a considerable standing agenda to address a variety of disarmament issues, but has not been able to undertake a programme of work since the conclusion of negotiations on the CTBT in 1996. The CD operates by consensus, giving every state an effective veto on progress.

The HINW conferences, which commenced in 2013, address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Meetings have so far been held in Oslo in 2013, Nayarit in 2014 and Vienna in 2014. The HINW conferences were established following renewed expressions of concern about humanitarian consequences at the NPT and elsewhere from 2010, demanding their in-depth consideration in a stand-alone forum. Political support for and focus on a humanitarian framing of the nuclear weapons issue has been more sustained than for any other recent initiative to encourage renewed activity on nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons are currently the only weapons of mass destruction not explicitly prohibited under international law. Discussion on the need for a treaty banning nuclear weapons has developed in parallel with the humanitarian initiative, and would be an achievable, legally coherent and logical next step developing from it. A ban treaty would represent an effective measure to advance nuclear disarmament, complementing states’ existing obligations and commitments.

Fewer delegations, fewer delegates, fewer interventions

Countries and territories are divided into four groups for this discussion paper: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income. Across available data from all forums on attendance and statements made, one trend appeared with a high level of consistency. This was that the higher a country’s income category, the more likely it was to send a delegation, the greater the size of that delegation on average, and the more likely that country was to deliver an individual statement.

Attendance and membership

In the forums for which attendance data was available (NPT and HINW), this trend is very clear across NPT attendance data, and slightly less pronounced in HINW data (Figures 2 and 3).
At the NPT Preparatory Committees, African, Latin American/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific parties attended in far lower proportions (between 23% and 64% of group members) than East European and WEOG countries (between 82% and 96% of group members). African countries were particularly underrepresented. For example, only 23% of African Group countries attended the 2012 Preparatory Committee. Richer, ‘Western’ countries therefore dominated attendance at NPT meetings taken overall.

At HINW meetings the picture of regional attendance has been more mixed. At the second HINW meeting in Nayarit, Mexico, the highest levels of participation by group were from African and Latin American/Caribbean countries. At the Oslo and Vienna HINW meetings, East European and WEOG states attended in the highest proportions. The difference in attendance levels between regional groupings was much smaller – and so regional representation more equal – for HINW conferences compared to NPT Preparatory Committee meetings.

For the CD, data was available on membership rather than attendance at individual sessions. Of the CD’s 65 members, 8 are low-income countries, 13 lower-middle income, 18 upper-middle income and 26 high income. The CD permits observer states at its meetings, whose presence must be endorsed by a consensus of CD members. At the sessions where lists of observer states were available (2013 and 2014), 19 were high-income countries. Some 26 high-income countries are not already CD members. The presence of high-income countries at the CD overall is therefore considerable. By contrast, four observer states in 2013 and two in 2014 were low-income countries. This is out of 46 low-income countries that are not CD members.

The expansion of CD membership to include a wider range of interests has been a subject of discussion at the forum for some time. Consensus is needed to make changes, as with all aspects of the CD. New members were added to the CD in 1996 and 1999, but no further review of membership has taken place since 2002, despite more than 20 countries expressing a desire to join. The last expansions are reported to have taken into account geographical representation. However, as well as an underrepresentation of low-income countries in its membership, the geographical distribution of current CD members is far from even. Looking at what proportion of each UN General Assembly country groupings are CD members, the WEOG is represented far more than any other group (Figure 4).

At open multilateral forums, the availability of sponsorship, for official and civil society delegates, is a good practice towards increasing inclusiveness in attendance. One reason why HINW meetings have achieved somewhat more equal levels of attendance from countries of different income groups in comparison to the NPT Preparatory Committee meetings, will be the sponsorship programmes that were available to delegations from lower-income countries.

There will likely be other factors as well. Attendance as a whole at HINW meetings has been rising since the first conference in Oslo. This may indicate the increased interest building in the humanitarian initiative, and that HINW conferences have represented a new opportunity for countries towards action on nuclear disarmament, where established processes have not made much recent progress. Such factors could also help to explain the relatively more equal attendance rates at HINW across country income categories, in comparison to most NPT meetings.

If low-income countries have fewer human and financial resources in their foreign ministries and diplomatic services, attendance at any given meeting may also be affected by: its location; duration; the expertise and preparation required; how much of a national or policy priority the forum represents; what decisions are made there and how these affect the country; and whether the forum is seen as effective and so worth
the time investment. Whether countries feel others will represent their views may also be relevant: individual countries, regional groupings or alliances could all do so. These factors will be investigated through qualitative research.

Attendance at HINW conferences will have required fewer resources than attending recent NPT meetings, not only because of sponsorship programmes but because they have been relatively short. Also, HINW conferences have not been meetings requiring decision-making or from which obligations were intended to have arisen. The overall human resources a country may have considered were necessary to participate might therefore have been lower than for NPT Review Conference meetings. The rank of official that might be required to attend, and the communications that must be maintained with decision-makers, might also have been lower.

**Delegation sizes**

Across all countries, delegations to HINW meetings were small compared with many NPT delegations. Though low-income countries still sent fewer delegates on average to HINW meetings than countries in higher income categories, the range in delegation sizes was not great, and the largest delegations (excluding those of the hosts and one other delegation at HINW in Oslo) numbered no more than 9. The average delegation size across all income categories was between 2 and 4 for all meetings.

At NPT meetings, the variation in delegation size between low-income and other countries has been much greater. At the 2010 Review Conference for example, the largest delegation sent by a high-income country had 43 delegates, and by a low-income country, 10. The average delegation size for a high-income country was 12, compared to just 4 for low-income countries.

Figures 3 and 5 show that between 2010-14 low-income countries as a group not only went to NPT meetings less, but generally sent smaller delegations than richer countries when they did. Attendance of all countries dropped for the Preparatory Committees in comparison to the Review Conference. The general drop in attendance rates likely relates in part to what is discussed and decided at the different meetings. Given Review Conferences are the most important aspect of the NPT process, where decisions that are binding on all parties are made, more countries might be expected to attend. The last Preparatory Committee before the 2015 Review Conference, which was the best attended, must aim to produce a consensus report and recommendations for the Review Conference, and so might be seen by countries as more important to attend. The locations of the Preparatory Committees could also be a factor. The 2014 Preparatory Committee took place in New York, where all countries tend to have larger missions.13

Low-income countries sent similar-sized delegations to the NPT Review Conference and Preparatory Committees. Higher-income countries by contrast tended to send significantly larger delegations to the Review Conference (Figure 5). This could be indicative of general limitations to low-income countries’ capacities for participation: even for the meeting that appears most important to all parties, lower-income countries did not increase their presence in the way that richer countries appeared to decide was required in order to achieve their objectives. At a basic level, small delegations would mean low-income countries were less able to cover any parallel sessions taking place at the Review Conference. Also, assuming that smaller delegations are less likely to contain specialists on all the issues addressed at the Review Conference, low-income countries would be at a disadvantage in addressing discussions. This link is suggested by the data on individual country statements.

**Individual statements**

Looking at the pattern of individual country statements made to all the forums considered in this paper, the higher a country or party’s income category, the more likely attendees were to make an individual statement, or the more statements were made. Available attendance data shows that not only did low-income countries attend meetings less with smaller delegations, but contributed fewer statements proportionally when they did – so were triply underrepresented. However, the extent of their under-representation in statements made varied across forums and the different sessions within particular meetings, increasing for sessions addressing more specific topics in comparison to general debates.

At the NPT, low-income countries have been seriously underrepresented in all discussions over the past five years. Almost three times the proportion of high income as low-income countries spoke individually at the 2010 Review Conference general debate (Figure 6).

The proportion of all NPT parties making statements to the Preparatory Committee’s general debates is lower than for the Review Conference general debate. The proportion of all NPT parties contributing statements to other NPT meeting sessions – main committees at the Review Conference and clusters and specific issues at the Preparatory Committees – is lower again. For low-income countries, the drop in participation at more specific discussions is much steeper. The percentage of low-income NPT parties making a statement to the main committees, clusters and specific issues was only 1% on average across all meetings between 2010 and 2014. At several of these individual sessions, no low-income countries contributed at all. At the 2014 Preparatory Committee, where attendance by all was highest, low-income countries only made statements to one cluster meeting.
Small delegations, with a narrower range of expertise within the delegation, may partly explain this lack of participation in more specific sessions. These sessions may also require preparation—including the reading of background papers submitted and the following of various developments—that smaller delegations or diplomatic missions with fewer resources and wider briefs may not have the time or willingness to prioritise over other issues. The low quantity of contributions may indicate a deeper lack of capacity: some lower-income countries may not have the resources to develop a fully informed elaboration of their national position on nuclear weapons and disarmament, and so choose not to articulate it.

HINW conferences have taken the format of opening statements and informative presentations followed by open general debate. Differing from the NPT by not being part of a treaty review process, they required no specific preparation from delegates. Low-income countries still contributed statements the least. At the second HINW conference in Nayarit, low-income countries spoke far less than high-income countries, even though there were proportionally more low-income countries present. This suggests that even if low-income countries attend forums and the subjects are not overly specialist, their voices will not necessarily be heard as much as they should. The difference between the proportion of high and low-income countries making statements at HINW was consistently smaller than at NPT meetings however. At the third HINW conference in Vienna, 60% of high-income countries made a statement compared to 43% of low-income countries. Out of the data available for this paper, the Vienna HINW meeting came closest to equal representation in statements made.

Regarding interventions made to the CD, across data on sessions from 2010-14, high-income members were more than twice as likely as low-income members to make an individual statement to any part of the year’s CD meetings. On average only 32% of low-income members made individual statements, compared to 68% of high-income members. Low-income countries are not only underrepresented in membership, but also what members there are make comparatively few interventions.

It is frequently observed that the CD is a forum for the discussion of nuclear disarmament that includes all nuclear-armed states. The need for nuclear disarmament affects all nations, so in principle countries of all regions and incomes perhaps should be equally represented at the CD. However, in its current deadlock the CD can advance no interests but those that favour the status quo. This may contribute to the lower participation of low-income countries as either members or observers at the CD, and the lack of interest from low-income countries in joining. Those with fewer resources to devote to multilateral disarmament processes may consider that pursuing inclusion in other, more effective forums would be more efficient.

### Alliances and groupings

In the data examined, across all forums statements were made on behalf of alliances, regional or other groupings. Regional organisations such as the African Union, Arab League, and ASEAN made interventions. Regional groupings formed or recognised within particular forums or the UN General Assembly also presented statements. Alliances formed outside specific forums also spoke, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Collective positions were also given by groups created specifically to address nuclear disarmament forums, such as the New Agenda Coalition, or that are relevant by virtue of the forum, such as the nuclear-armed states parties of the NPT or states that are part of nuclear-weapon free zones.

One reason for low-income countries’ lower participation could be that, given limited capacity, the representation afforded by a group statement is seen as adequate, particularly if the position of the group sufficiently reflects their concerns. If countries choose to rely solely on group statements, however, their active participation is diminished: individual countries’ positions may not be adequately represented, or indeed fully developed, as a result. Countries may be disenfranchised by group positions in this way.

Across the data, the number of group contributions was generally small, with most groups giving statements to ten or fewer of the debates or session parts covered by the data (of which there were 58). The significance of most group statements to either explaining or addressing the underrepresentation of low-income countries may not be large. The exceptions to the low numbers of group statements made across debates were from the European Union and the NAM. The NAM’s statements were mainly to the NPT, with some statements to the CD. The NAM represents a high proportion of low-income countries (Figure 7), so the quantity of NAM interventions could be a significant factor affecting their individual participation.

The NAM, however, represents a wide variety of states and interests apart from those of individual low-income countries, and its collective positions may sometimes be opposed even to these members’ direct individual participation in multilateral discussions. For example, the NAM is not a member of the CD. Its collective position can carry no weight there and it cannot represent its low-income members who are not part of the CD. Nevertheless, the NAM has frequently stated the position that the CD is the crucial forum for disarmament negotiations. This is despite the CD
excluding the majority of NAM members, not giving weight to contributions from the NAM as an entity, and its overall ineffectiveness as a forum. The varying capacities and power dynamics within the NAM can also mean the adoption of positions that reflect those of certain states with particular interests.\textsuperscript{18}

Whether low-income countries are less likely to contribute individually where there is a statement by the NAM is difficult to analyse from the available data. The sample is small, and the fact that so few low-income countries are not part of the NAM makes this comparison difficult. The other factors affecting whether a country makes a statement cannot be accounted for in the data. An analysis of the pattern of individual statements given to the NPT (where the NAM made statements) and to HINW (where the NAM did not), by NAM and non-NAM states across all income categories, revealed the following:

\begin{itemize}
\item High-income and upper-middle-income NAM and non-NAM countries appear to contribute in a similar way whether NAM is making a statement or not.
\item Lower-middle-income NAM members contributed more than non-NAM members when the NAM was making statements.
\item Low-income NAM countries however contributed more (including more than non-NAM low-income countries) when NAM was not making a statement.
\end{itemize}

This could imply some degree of reliance on NAM statements by some low-income countries, which has been suggested by other research.\textsuperscript{19}

Given the small amount of data on HINW and other factors that may influence contribution on specific parts of NPT meetings however, this requires further qualitative investigation.

**Civil society participation**

As well as the equitable representation of official country positions in nuclear disarmament forums, the adequate representation of the views of global civil society to governments is arguably necessary towards achieving more balanced discussions. This is particularly the case where the official positions of countries do not match the needs of all sections of their populations. Though civil society is not party to international agreements, their role in relation to states - of scrutiny, bringing new ideas and representing certain groups which may not otherwise have a voice - is crucial.

Rules on civil society participation vary between multilateral forums. At the CD, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom has been permitted to deliver a statement for International Women’s Day each year as a guest, but no other civil society involvement is permitted.\textsuperscript{20} A recent draft proposal to permit civil society organisations the same speaking rights as observer states was rejected. At the CTBT, civil society is invited to participate and make statements as an observer to Article XIV but not ministerial conferences. At the NPT, NGOs who register are permitted to attend apart from at certain closed sessions, and a session is designated for NGOs to address the Review Conference. A room is also allocated to NGOs for side events. At the HINW conferences, civil society including NGOs, academics and faith groups were invited to give presentations and were able to take the floor for interventions during debates.

Concentrating on statements and presentations, the contribution of civil society across all forums compared with the contribution of states is minimal, as might be expected from the rules on participation. The highest proportion of civil society participation was at the HINW conferences, whose organisers deliberately sought to include a range of expert and civil society perspectives to inform participants. This is very different from the NPT, where NGO contributions are solicited for just one session, and not permitted at any other time.

Across the small amount of data available, civil society speaking slots were overwhelmingly by organisations and individuals from high-income countries. Some contributions were from global coalitions or internationally organised movements that represent members and sections from many countries but are headquartered in high-income countries (such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the International Coalition to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)). Global civil society movements will often take steps to encourage the participation of members from lower-income countries, either locally or at international meetings (including through sponsorship). Attendance data shows participants from a range of countries were present at meetings under the banner of ICAN, for example. However, the general profile of civil society contributions arguably indicates a further under-representation of perspectives from lower-income countries. A major factor in this is likely to be financial resources.

It is significant that the HINW conferences sought deliberately to include the perspectives of survivors of nuclear tests around the world and the nuclear bombings of Japan (who have also spoken at the civil society sessions of the NPT). These voices have often been excluded from international discussions of nuclear weapons, but from a humanitarian perspective give a vital viewpoint that states should consider. Towards more globally inclusive discussions on nuclear disarmament, certain particularly vital perspectives such as those of survivors must also be represented.
Conclusions and ways forward

This review of data on participation in nuclear disarmament forums shows a clear trend of underrepresentation of low-income and non-Western countries, both in the attendance and participation of official delegations and civil society. These countries may, overall, have different perspectives on nuclear issues compared to richer countries. This is suggested by the high proportion of low-income countries that are part of a nuclear weapon-free zone, and the considerable number of high-income countries that are part of a nuclear alliance. Discussion and outcomes at the forums studied may therefore currently be skewed in favour of certain framings and technical perspectives that place more value on nuclear weapons.

The factors that may inform the trend of low-income country representation (from the technical and material capacities needed to attend to the perceived utility of different forums) require further investigation. This will be undertaken as part of the broader project this paper is a part of. Data on public attendance at and statements to multilateral forums also does not give a complete picture of how action within these forums, or on nuclear disarmament more broadly, is influenced. Perspectives on this will also be explored as part of this project.

In terms of the type of participation reviewed in this paper, a country fully articulating their positions not only requires their having the financial resources to attend meetings. It also requires countries being able to field sufficient informed personnel who can give statements that contribute meaningfully to debate and outcomes. Group or representative statements can potentially improve representation when articulating certain collective positions, but also carry the potential for disenfranchisement. A range of solutions is likely needed, from financial assistance to capacity building on technical content. Perspectives on ways forward will be investigated in further research.

More equal participation among countries would not necessarily mean that the global discussion of nuclear disarmament would develop in a progressive direction. However, greater equitability between countries in multilateral forums is important in principle – as well as having the potential to change dynamics. Future initiatives to advance nuclear disarmament, such as the commencement of negotiations on a ban treaty, must proceed on this principle. Such processes must also not be blockable by any particular country: requiring complete consensus can induce deadlock, and is not the same as upholding open inclusion.
Appendix: Note on methodology and terms

The four forums discussed in this paper were selected as the principal locations of current multilateral discussion and action on nuclear disarmament. Treaties concluded bilaterally, regionally or between a small number of states, and those that currently involve no meetings, were excluded.

Information was gathered as comprehensively as possible from publicly available lists of attendance and statements made. Data was collected either from archives collated by Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org), or from websites created for the particular meetings studied, by the organisers or associated organisations. Data was gathered for meetings between 2010 and 2014 for all forums (excluding the HINW conferences, which have been held since 2013), to incorporate the most recent meetings of relevance, including the last Review Conference of the NPT.

Attendance, delegation size and statement data was available for NPT and HINW meetings. For the CTBT, only statement data was available. For the CD, data on statements and overall membership, but not attendance at specific meetings, was available. Information on approved observer states, but again not their attendance at specific meetings, was available for 2013-2015 only.

The country income categories used in this paper (“low-income”, “lower-middle-income”, “upper-middle-income”, “high-income”) are based on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2012/2013. Using this list, countries with a per capita GNI of less than $1005 in 2010 (Least Developed Countries and Other Low Income Countries) were grouped into “low-income”, and countries not appearing on the list of ODA recipients were classified as “high-income”. For regional analysis, membership of UN General Assembly voting groupings were used, to represent existing blocs and to permit more meaningful analysis (given the North America geographical region contains only two countries). The groups are: African Group, Asia-Pacific Group, Eastern European Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), Western European and Others Group (WEOG) (which contains states from Western Europe and North America as well as Australia, New Zealand and Israel).

END NOTES
3 Five NWFZ treaties cover 115 countries (60% of UN member states); Mongolia has separately declared itself a nuclear weapon free zone. The five NWFZ treaties are: Tlatelolco (covering Latin America and Caribbean NWFZ), Rarotonga (South Pacific), Pelindaba (Africa), Bangkok (Southeast Asia), and Semipalatinsk (Central Asia). For a comparative analysis of legal obligations arising under NWFZ treaties, see Article 36 (April 2014) ‘Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and Banning Nuclear Weapons’, available at: http://www.article36.org/?p=684.
4 These are China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the US.
5 Background information on all forums from Reaching Critical Will: http://reachingcriticalwill.org and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization: http://www.ctbto.org
7 See Appendix: Note on methodology and terms for how the list of countries and territories we used was generated. For brevity, we refer to countries and territories as ‘countries’ in this paper.
8 See Appendix: Note on methodology and terms for how each group was defined.
9 Statements made on behalf of groups or alliances are also discussed briefly below.
10 The groups are: African Group, Asia-Pacific Group, Eastern European Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), Western European and Others Group (WEOG) (which contains states from Western Europe and North America as well as Australia, New Zealand and Israel). See ‘United Nations Regional Groups of Member States’, available at: http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml. See the ‘Appendix: Note on methodology and terms’ on how these groupings are used for analysis in this paper.
12 Several of these factors were discussed in Hugo & Egeland (December 2014).
14 This capacity problem was also discussed in Hugo & Egeland (December 2014)
15 The NPT process covers only the declared nuclear weapons possessors at the time of the treaty’s negotiation.
16 Some of the most prominent of these at the NPT, which seek to bring new ideas and technical analysis through work before and during conferences, are made up of richer countries. See Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (24 February 2015) ‘Coalitions to Watch at the 2015 NPT Review Conference’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/coalitions-watch-2015-npt-review-conference/
19 Hugo & Egeland (December 2014)
21 See Hugo & Egeland (2014) for an exploration of some of the possibilities.